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Résumé / Abstract
Nous développons dans cet article un modèle principal-agent permettant
de mieux cerner l'arbitrage inéluctable entre incitations et flexibilité en situation
d'information asymétrique. Nous caractérisons la meilleure réponse de l'organisation
face à ce défi en termes d'un niveau optimal d'inertie. Une plus grande flexibilité
d'adaptation aux changements dans l'environnement ou l'information, que ces
changements soient observés par le principal ou l'agent, peut réduire les efforts non-
observables consentis par l'agent pour assurer le succès de l'organisation.
Our objective in this paper is to illustrate and better understand the
unavoidable arbitrage between incentives and flexibility in contexts of
asymmetric information and to characterize the general features of an
appropriate response to this challenge. We show that procedures and institutions
in organizations which reduce the capacity to implement change may be
necessary to generate the optimal level of inertia. We show that more flexibility
in adapting to changing conditions or new information, typically known or
observed by either the agent or the principal but not both, may come at the
expense of efforts exerted up front by the agent to make the organization more
successful. There is a trade-off in this context between ex ante efforts and ex post
flexibility of adaptation.
Mots Clés : Incitations, Flexibilité, Adaptation, Information asymétrique
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1. INTRODUCTION
Building exible companies or agile corporations has become a buzzword in the man-
agement literature.
1
Without exception, exibility has a positive tune: more exibility
is better.
2
Yet, if exibility is so precious, why so many organizations (including, not
the least, public bureaucracies) fail to meet the challenge of change ? Most of us have
experienced the frustrations of rigid and inexible organizations and bureaucratic rules.
Some large and powerful companies have reacted too slowly to the need of change and
were brought to the brink of bankruptcy and obsolescence. The political cost of chang-
ing social and economic policies has been blamed for the growing burden of government
decits.
Rumelt (1994) claims that the most crucial problem facing the top level management
of corporations or organizations, large and small, public and private, is not product-
market strategy but indeed organizational change: \If managers are to commit energy,
careers, time, and attention to a program of change, there must be trust that the direction
1
A typical management literature denition of strategic exibility is given by Harrigan (1985, page 1) as \: : :
rms' abilities to reposition themselves in a market, change their game plans, or dismantle their current
strategies when customers they serve are no longer as attractive as they once were." There are few general
and formal denitions of exibility proposed in the literature. George Stigler (1939) pioneered the analysis
of cost exibility by stating that rms in general have to make a choice among dierent equipment giving
rise to dierent cost congurations, for example a cost function which has a relatively wide at bottom and
a cost function which can attain a lower minimum average cost at the expense of steeper rising average cost
as production moves away from the most ecient scale of production. More formal denitions of exibility
were given by Marshak and Nelson (1962) and Jones and Ostroy (1984). Those decision theoretic denitions
are reviewed in Boyer and Moreaux (1989).
2
A research report from Business International (1991) stresses the need for companies to be exible given
the important changes in the way competition operates and is likely to operate in the next decade: we
are told that competitors now form a forest rather than a few trees around the rm-fortress, and markets
are becoming more and more ephemeral and liable to signicant and sudden variations. On the basis
of a large number of case studies, Business International claims that exibility is indeed the all-inclusive
concept integrating a whole set of recent management theories, and moreover that \: : : collaboration inside
and outside the company is the way exibility is achieved." The thesis of Business International is that
the process of change towards exibility and collaboration in a company is built around four paths: rst
from a reliance on rules to guidance according to goals, second from motivation by product possibilities
to motivation by market possibilities, third from hierarchy to network in which the corporate system is
constantly recreated, and fourth from compliance based on an internal carrot and stick incentive system
to alliances, both internally and externally, based on passing the carrot and the stick to the participants
themselves, whether they are customers, employees, suppliers or partners. The latter path implies an
internal reorganization based on the empowerment of employees, information sharing between employees
and management, more and smaller goal-oriented units, more pressure to act simultaneously and more
customer pressure.
1
chosen will not be lightly altered. Here we touch the central paradox that change may
require the promise of future inertia."
3
In other words, today's inertia may be the result of
a past commitment necessary to implement change. One explanation for organizational
sclerosis goes as follow. In order to prosper, an organization must provide incentives
to its members and promise them future rents. As the organization grows older, these
rents, which are disseminated across the organization, inhibits change. Members of the
organization learn to use their power to protect their rents and the conicts between
interest groups will make it hard to reform the organization. A signicant free-rider
problem arises and sclerosis sets in until the very survival of the organization and of the
rents associated with it are in danger. Even then, the organization may be unable to
orchestrate change. Olson (1982) uses such a framework to explain the rise and decline
of nations.
This paper attempts to answer some basic questions which the above story raises.
The allocation of rents and power to bring or block change is in some way endogenously
determined and results from the organizational design. But then, why would an organi-
zation give to interest groups within the organization the incentives and power to block
changes that might be benecial to the overall organization ? How will an organization
choose to allocate rents and decision power ? Why and in what sense does such an al-
location generate inertia ? The relatively simple model presented in this paper is meant
to address those questions in a formal way. We model the endogenous determination of
the level of exibility or inertia as a rational choice made by the organization.
4
We use the most stylized and abstract representation of an organization: it is
composed of a principal (the owner/manager/supervisor) who is generally the residual
3
Rumelt argues that one source of inertia is dulled motivation with other sources being distorted perception,
failed creative response, political deadlocks, and action disconnects. The cost of change, the loyalty of
consumers, and the cross-subsidy comforts, a kind of soft budget constraint on some activities or divisions
of the rm, may lead the rm to resist change.
4
In the language of Business International (1991), exible companies : : : must balance rigid structure and
loose network, clear strategy and opportunistic market response; : : : the capacity for fast response with
rm decisions on when to use it, the ability to collaborate with the readiness to protect assets."
2
claimant and an agent (the executive/worker/supervised). Our objective is to provide a
simple model in order to illustrate and better understand the unavoidable arbitrage be-
tween incentives and exibility in contexts of asymmetric information and to characterize
the general features of an appropriate response to this challenge.
5
The basic structure of the model is as follows. An agent is asked to invest an
unobservable \specic (sunk)" eort to increase the probability of success of some initial
project. New information (a signal) is then generated about the protability of an
alternative project; the projects being assumed to be mutually exclusive, the organization
must decide whether or not to abandon the initial project in favor of the alternative one.
If the organization decides to switch to the alternative project, the agent is again asked to
invest an unobservable, specic and sunk level of eort which increases the probability of
success of the alternative project. Finally, outcome is observed and payments are made.
More exibility to abandon the initial project to pursue the alternative project will
in general be detrimental to the level of specic eorts that the agent will be willing to
exert to increase the probability of success of the initial project (hence the fundamental
trade-o between ex ante incentives and ex post exibility). Moreover, allocation of rents
will distort the choice between project 1 and project 2.
The principal's problem is analyzed in three dierent informational settings. In
each setting, the agent's eorts both for the initial and the alternative projects are
unobservable by the principal. The agent receives rents in the organization because of
moral hazard and limited liability. In order to induce the agent to provide the proper
level of eort, the principal must reward the agent if the project undertaken is successful
while limited liability prevents the principal from nancing this reward through a penalty
in case of failure (for instance by a bond posted by the agent). In the following section,
5
In a dierent context, Boyer and Moreaux (1995) characterize the trade-o between commitment and ex-
ibility. They consider a duopoly model of exible manufacturing technology adoption in which asymmetric
equilibria emerges, a rm choosing a exible technology while the other chooses an inexible technology
even if both rm are in perfectly similar situations.
3
we analyze, after presenting the formal model, the benchmark case where the signal
on the protability of the alternative project is common knowledge. In Section 3, the
signal is observed only by the principal while in Section 4, it is private information of the
agent. If only the agent observes the signal , he may have an incentive to misreport 
in order to favor the project in which his rent is larger. Similarly, if the principal is the
only one observing the signal, she may want to misreport it in order to maximize her
net benets. The principal must ex ante select and commit to a payment prole and a
switching decision rule providing the necessary incentives. The organizational response
to these distorted incentives is to generate a bias in favor of the status quo.
Finally, in Section 5, we compare the results obtained from the analyses of the dier-
ent settings. If the signal about the alternative project can or should, for some technical
or economic reasons, be observed only by either the agent or the principal, to whom
should be given the responsibility of observing the signal and recommending change ?
The eective or real authority for recommending and/or implementing change need not
always be retained by the principal. We provide further discussion and comments in
the conclusion. The Appendix contains the detailed proofs of the propositions and the
corollaries.
4
2. THE MODEL
The organization, represented by a principal and an agent, must invest in an initial
project. Later on, the organization will observe a signal  about the probability of success
of an alternative project. Based on the observed value of , the organization may choose
either to abandon the initial project 1 in favor of the alternative project 2 or pursue
project 1 (the projects are mutually exclusive).
The timing of observations and decisions is as follows. First, the agent invests some
unobservable level of eort e 2 f`(low); h(high)g into the initial project 1, at cost of eort
V
`
1
= 0 and V
h
1
> 0 respectively. This investment in eort determines the probability of
success p
e
1
of that project with p
h
1
> p
`
1
. Eort is specic to the project and considered
as sunk. Second, the signal  is observed: it takes value g (good) with probability  and
value b (bad) with probability (1   ); we assume that  >
1
2
. The organization must
then decide whether to abandon the initial project in favor of the alternative one or to
maintain the initial project (the status quo). If project 2 is selected, then the agent must
again provide some unobservable level of eort e
2
which is either low (`) or high (h), at
a cost of V
`
2
= 0 and V
h
2
> 0 respectively. The level of eort e
2
together with the value
of the signal  determine the probability of success of project 2. Finally, the state of
nature, that is the outcome of the project chosen, is revealed and payments are made.
The outcomes of the projects are random. The expected level of net prots depends
on the project pursued, on the level of eort invested by the agent and on the value of
. Let R
e
1
be the expected return from project 1 when eort e has been invested and
let R
e
2
be the expected return of project 2 given e and . The probability of success of
project 1 is given by p
h
1
[p
`
1
] if the agent's eort in project 1 is high [low]. The probability
of success of project 2 depends on eort and on the value of the signal . It is given
by p
hg
2
, p
`g
2
, p
hb
2
or p
`b
2
depending on whether the agent's eort and the signal are (h; g),
(`; g), (h; b) or (`; b). We will make the following assumption on the impact of eort on
5
the probability of success:
(A1) p
h
1
> p
`
1
> 0; p
`g
2
> 0; p
`b
2
= 0; p
hg
2
  p
`g
2
> p
hb
2
> 0;
that is, a signal g is relatively favorable to project 2; moreover eort is more productive
in raising the probability of success of project 2 when the signal is indeed favorable to
project 2 ( = g).
An incentive system takes the general form of a payment prole w specifying a
payment contingent on the project pursued (1 or 2), on whether it is a success s or a
failure f , and on whether the announced value of  is g or b: fw
s
1
; w
f
1
; w
sg
2
; w
fg
2
; w
sb
2
; w
fb
2
g.
Limited liability requires that w  0. A switching rule, which species when project 1 will
be abandoned in favor of project 2, is a pair (r
g
; r
b
), where r
g
[r
b
] denotes the probability
that project 2 is chosen when the value of  observed or announced is g [b].
The eort level exerted by the agent is always a private information of the agent and
therefore, in order to induce the high level of eort, the principal must oer a payment
prole such that it is privately benecial for the agent to provide that level of eort.
To achieve this, the principal must create a wedge between the payment made in case
of success and the payment made in case of failure such that the expected net payment
received by the agent is weakly larger when e = h. This, together with limited liability,
generates rents for the agent. We assume that the agent's reservation utility level is 0.
If project 2 is chosen when  = g, the wedge must satisfy
p
hg
2
w
sg
2
+ (1  p
hg
2
)w
fg
2
  V
h
2
 p
`g
2
w
sg
2
+ (1  p
`g
2
)w
fg
2
or
w
sg
2
  w
fg
2

V
h
2
p
hg
2
  p
`g
2
  
g
2
: (2.1)
The limited liability assumption implies w
fg
2
 0, and therefore w
sg
2
  
g
2
. Hence, we
obtain that the net payment received by the agent is no less than p
hg
2
 
g
2
+w
fg
2
 V
h
2
, which
6
is equal to p
`g
2
V
h
2
=(p
hg
2
  p
`g
2
) + w
fg
2
> 0, and therefore exceeds the agent's reservation
utility: the agent receives an eort-based informational rent.
Similarly, if project 2 is chosen when  = b, the wedge must satisfy
w
sb
2
  w
fb
2

V
h
2
p
hb
2
  p
`b
2
=
V
h
2
p
hb
2
  
b
2
: (2.2)
Again, the limited liability assumption implies w
fb
2
 0, and therefore w
sb
2
  
b
2
.
However, using A1, we obtain that p
hb
2
 
b
2
+ w
fb
2
  V
h
2
= p
`b
2
V
h
2
=(p
hb
2
  p
`b
2
) + w
fb
2
= w
fb
2
.
Hence the agent receives no rent for providing eort when the signal is bad if w
fb
2
= 0.
Note that from A1 we have  
g
2
<  
b
2
: since eort is more ecient in increasing the
probability of success when  = g, the eort inducing payment wedge for the alternative
project is larger when the signal is bad.
For project 1, the wedge (w
s
1
 w
f
1
) necessary to induce a high level of eort must take
into account the fact that the project may be abandoned in favor of project 2 after the
eort cost has been sunk. From the switching rule (r
g
; r
b
), this will occur with probability
r
g
+ (1  )r
b
. If there is such a switch, then the agent will obtain a rent of p
h
2
 

2
  V
h
2
from the payment prole relevant for project 2. But given that  is independent of
whether the eort put into project 1 is high or low, the value of the appropriate rent
is added on both sides of the relevant incentive constraint for e
1
; therefore, the eort
inducing payment wedge for project 1 depends on the probability that a switch will
occur but is independent of the rent itself accruing to the agent from the realization of
project 2. Hence, this wedge must satisfy:
[(1  r
g
)+(1  )(1  r
b
)][p
h
1
(w
s
1
  w
f
1
) + w
f
1
]  V
h
1
 [(1  r
g
) + (1  )(1  r
b
)][p
`
1
(w
s
1
  w
f
1
) + w
f
1
]
that is
(w
s
1
  w
f
1
) 
 
1
(1  r
g
) + (1  )(1  r
b
)
>  
1

V
h
1
p
h
1
  p
`
1
: (2.3)
7
Ex ante, the agent receives from project 1 an expected payment
p
h
1
[(1  r
g
) + (1  )(1  r
b
)]
 
1
[(1  r
g
) + (1  )(1  r
b
)]
  V
h
1
+ w
f
1
equal to p
`
1
V
h
1
=[p
h
1
  p
`
1
] + w
f
1
> 0 which is also the ex post rent from project 1 if the
decision to pursue project 1 is taken.
We will consider three alternative information structures. In the rst case (bench-
mark case), the signal  is jointly observable by the principal and the agent; in the second
case, it is observable only by the principal and in the third case, it is observable only
by the agent.
6
When  is observable and contractible, the optimal organizational design
will maximize the principal's expected prots subject to the limited liability constraints
and, if the principal wishes to elicit a high level of eort from the agent, the incentive
constraints (2:1), (2:2) and (2:3).
We do not intend here to consider all the possible cases for this problem. We wish
instead to limit our attention to cases where both the eort and the signal are meaningful.
More precisely, we limit the set of exogenous parameters [R
e
1
, R
e
2
, , p
e
1
, p
e
2
, V
e
1
, V
e
2
]
such that the principal always prefers to elicit a high level of eort for project 1 and
project 2 and such that a switch to project 2 occurs if and only if the common knowledge
signal is favorable, that is, if and only if  = g. This is the interesting case on which we
want to concentrate. Therefore, we make the following assumptions:
(A2) R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
(1  )
> R
`
1
; R
h
2
   

2
> R
`
2
for  2 fg; bg
(A3) R
h
1
< R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
6
We do not model the process by which a `new' project is discovered. One possible way to model this
process in the rst context is to suppose that eort can be extended either to raise the probability of
success (p
c
(e
c
)) of the current project 1 or to raise the probability (p
n
(e
n
)) of discovering a new and better
project. Designing ecient schemes for total eort provision e
c
+ e
n
= e at cost  (e) and for allocating
that eort between the two objectives is clearly a major concern of organizational design. Moreover, the
value of e could depend on market structure as one can infer from Tirole (1988, chap. 4).
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(A4) R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
(1  )
> R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
b
2
Proposition 1: Under A1 to A4, the principal prefers to induce a high level of eort both
for project 1 and for project 2 and switching occurs if and only if  = g.
Note that from a social welfare point of view, a switch to the alternative project
should occur ex post when  = g (should not occur when  = b) if and only if the
expected net total benets from project 2, assuming that the agent exert a high level
of eort in all cases, are larger (smaller) than the expected total gross benets from the
original project, that is, i
R
h
1
(
< R
hg
2
  V
h
2
if  = g
> R
hb
2
  V
h
2
if  = b
(2.4)
Under the assumptions of the model, the switching rule r
b
= 0 and r
g
= 1 is also
the socially optimal rule. Indeed we have: R
h
1
< R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
< R
hg
2
  V
h
2
and
R
h
1
> R
h
1
 
 
1
(1 )
> R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
b
2
= R
hb
2
  V
2
h
.
The above analysis and result can be extended to the case where the signal is observed
by both the principal and the agent but is not contractible. Giving the authority to
the principal, as the residual claimant, still allows the implementation of the optimal
allocation with r
b
= 0 and r
g
= 1. The key is to notice that the principal has no
incentive to misreport . If  = g, we have R
hg
2
  p
hg
1
 
g
2
> R
h
1
> R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
1 
and thus
the principal will prefer to recommend change. If  = b, the principal knows that if she
recommends change, the agent will choose a low level of eort unless (w
s
2
  w
f
2
)   
b
2
.
Since by assumption R
h
1
> maxfR
`b
2
  V
`
2
; R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
b
2
g, it is not in her interest to
recommend change.
We use the above as a benchmark for the following sections. We shall consider how
the fact that  becomes private information aects the rents in the organization and
the switching rule. We will show that when the signal is private information of either
the principal or the agent, switching to project 2 may not always occur when  = g.
9
Moreover, we will show that, when the signal can be observed by the principal or the
agent but not by both, the principal may sometimes be better o observing the signal
herself and sometimes be better o by letting the signal be observed by the agent.
10
3. THE SIGNAL  IS OBSERVABLE ONLY BY THE PRINCIPAL.
We consider now the case where the signal on the protability of the alternative
project is observed only by the principal. We assume that the principal cannot commit
herself not to use opportunistically her private information on . The principal's problem
is to select an incentive scheme and a credible switching rule so that the agent chooses
the high level of eort expecting rationally that the principal will reveal truthfully the
observed signal and apply the announced switching rule. The credibility of the switching
rule will depend on the principal's relative interests in revealing the signal she observes
and, given the signal revealed, in letting the announced switching rule apply. The
principal's relative interests will themselves rest on the payment prole, that is, the
structure of payments to be made to the agent in the dierent possible outcomes.
The following constraint states that it should not be in the principal's best interest
to always pretend that project 2 is bad:
[(1  )(1  r
b
) + (1  r
g
)][R
h
1
 

p
h
1
(w
s
1
  w
f
1
) + w
f
1

]
+ (1  )r
b
[R
hb
2
 

p
hb
2
(w
sb
2
  w
fb
2
) + w
fb
2

] + r
g
[R
hg
2
 

p
hg
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) + w
fg
2

]
(1  r
g
)[R
h
1
 

p
h
1
(w
s
1
  w
f
1
) + w
f
1

]
+ (1  )r
g
[R
hb
2
 

p
hb
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) + w
fg
2

] + r
g
[R
hg
2
 

p
eg
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) + w
fg
2

]:
One can note that the third terms on each side are the same. This constraint can be
rewritten as
(r
g
 r
b
)[R
h
1
 

p
h
1
(w
s
1
  w
f
1
) + w
f
1

] 
r
g
[R
hg
2
 

p
hg
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) + w
fg
2

]  r
b
[R
hg
2
 

p
hg
2
(w
sb
2
  w
fb
2
) + w
fb
2

]
(3.1)
Similarly, it should not be in the principal's best interest to always pretend that project
11
2 is good, a condition which can be written as
r
g
[R
hb
2
 

p
hb
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) + w
fg
2

] r
b
[R
hb
2
 

p
hb
2
(w
sb
2
  w
fb
2
) + w
fb
2

]
[(r
g
  r
b
)][R
h
1
 

p
h
1
(w
s
1
  w
f
1
) + w
f
1

]
(3.2)
The principal's problem becomes:
max
r
b
;r
g
;w

[(1  )(1 r
b
) + (1  r
g
)][R
h
1
 

p
h
1
(w
s
1
  w
f
1
) + w
f
1

]
+ (1  )r
b
[R
hb
2
 

p
hb
2
(w
sb
2
  w
fb
2
) + w
fb
2

]
+ r
g
[R
hg
2
 

p
hg
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) + w
fg
2

]

subject to (2:1); (2:2); (2:3); (3:1); and (3:2)
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>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
;
(3.3)
We obtain
Proposition 2: The solution to the principal's problem (3:3) entails: constraint (3:1) is
not binding, w
f
1
= 0, w
s
1
=
 
1
(1 r
g
)
, (w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) =  
g
2
, w
fg
2
= max

0; (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
)  
(R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
(1 r
g
)
)
	
, r
b
= 0 and r
P
g
solves:
max
r
g
2[0;1]
h
(1  r
g
)(R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
1  r
g
)
+ r
g

R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
 max

0 ; (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
)  (R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
1  r
g
)
	
i
:
(3.4)
The optimal level of exibility in the organization, r
P
g
, is determined by the level
of R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
relative to R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
(1 )
and R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
. The value of R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
measures the expected benets of the principal when she pretends that project 2 is good
when it is truly bad. If the agent is fooled, the principal will need to pay him only
p
hb
2
 
g
2
< p
hb
2
 
b
2
= V
h
2
in order to induce a high level of eort from the agent. This could
be advantageous for the principal since under assumption A1:
p
hb
2
 
g
2
= p
hb
2
V
h
2
p
hg
2
  p
`g
2
< V
h
2
< p
hg
2
V
h
2
p
hg
2
  p
`g
2
= p
hg
2
 
g
2
:
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Because  is not observable by the agent and because the principal could exploit
opportunistically her information, by pretending that project 2 is good when it is bad,
extra agency costs must be incurred. In order to credibly convey that she will not engage
in such behavior, the principal must compensate the agent when project 2 fails. The
agency costs thus increase by
r
g
maxf0 ; (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
)  (R
h
1
 
p
h
1
 
1
(1  r
g
)
)g: (3.5)
These agency costs are increasing and convex in r
g
. This introduces a bias towards the
status quo.
The principal's expected prot can be expressed as
(r
g
; C) = (1  r
g
)R
h
1
+ r
g
R
hg
2
  C (3.6)
where C is the payment to the agent (labor cost); the isoprot curves have slope
dC
dr
g



(r
g
;C)=
= (R
hg
2
 R
h
1
):
From Proposition 2, we can write the expected labor cost as a function of the exibility
level as follows:
C
P
(r
g
) = p
h
1
 
1
+ r
g
p
hg
2
 
g
2
+ r
g
max

0; (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
)  (R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
1  r
g
)
	
: (3.7)
Let us dene ~r
P
g
as the value of r
g
for which (R
hb
2
 p
hb
2
 
g
2
) = (R
h
1
 p
h
1
 
1
1 r
g
) if a solution
in [0; 1] exists,
7
that is,
~r
P
g
=
1


1 
p
h
1
 
1
R
h
1
  (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
)

:
The C
P
(r
g
) function is illustrated on Figure 1 together with the isoprot curves of
(r
g
; C) for the case 0 < ~r
P
g
< 1.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
7
We set ~r
P
g
= 0 when R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
> R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
and ~r
P
g
= 1 when R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
< R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
1 
.
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The optimal level of exibility is always in the interval [~r
P
g
; 1] since by assumption A3, the
slope of the isoprot curves is larger than the slope of the expected labor cost function
to the left of ~r
P
g
.
8
The optimum r
P
g
may be either at the kink ~r
P
g
of the expected labor
cost curve or at the tangency point between the convex portion of the labor cost curve
and an isoprot curve.
Corollary 1: The principal chooses the common knowledge exibility level, r
P
g
= 1, i
p
h
1
 
1
 max

(1 )[R
h
1
 (R
hb
2
 p
hb
2
 
g
2
)] ; (1 )
2
[(R
hg
2
 p
hg
2
 
g
2
) (R
hb
2
 p
hb
2
 
g
2
)]
	
: (3.8)
The optimal exibility level is equal to 1 if the principal nds no value in misreporting
the value of the signal  even if she could do it without cost. When she has to bear extra
cost to make her announcement credible, she still chooses r
g
= 1 if the slope of the
isoprot curves is always larger than the slope of the expected labor cost function.
Corollary 2: The principal chooses complete inertia, r
P
g
= 0, i
p
h
1
 
1
 (R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
)  (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
) (3.9)
If (3:9) holds, the best the principal can do is to never abandon project 1. The
incentives for the principal to always pretend that project 2 is good are so strong that it
becomes too costly for the principal to credibly convey that project 2 is good. Complete
inertia is implemented in the organization.
Corollary 3: The principal chooses partial exibility
1

"
1 min
n
 
p
h
1
 
1
(R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
)  (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
)

1
2
;maxf0;
p
h
1
 
1
R
h
1
  (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
)
g
o
#
:
(3.10)
i neither (3:8) nor (3:9) hold.
8
As shown above, the slope of the isoprot curves is (R
hg
2
  R
h
1
). The slope of the expected labor cost
function to the left of ~r
P
g
is (p
hg
2
 
g
2
  p
h
1
 
1
).
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The closer p
h
1
 
1
is to the upper bound (R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
)   (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
), the more
the principal is tempted to misrepresent the value of the alternative project when the
signal is bad and therefore the larger the level of inertia chosen and implemented by the
principal will be.
9
Thus:
Corollary 4: The level of inertia in an organization (when the principal is the one
getting the information  on the value of the alternative project) is positively related to
p
h
1
 
1
 p
h
1
V
h
1
p
h
1
 p
`
1
and to (p
hg
2
 p
hb
2
) 
g
2

p
hg
2
 p
hb
2
p
hg
2
 p
`g
2
V
h
2
and negatively related to the dierence
(R
hg
2
  R
hb
2
). That is, positively related to V
h
1
, p
`
1
, p
`g
2
and V
h
2
; and negatively related to
p
h
1
and p
hb
2
; it is positively related to p
hg
2
if and only if p
hb
2
> p
`g
2
.
9
As long as assumptions A2, A3 and A4 remain satised.
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4. THE SIGNAL  IS OBSERVABLE ONLY BY THE AGENT.
When the signal  is observable only by the agent, the principal must commit to a
payment schedule and a switching rule such that the agent will not misreport . Given
a switching rule (r
b
; r
g
), the agent will truthfully reveal  if only if the following two
conditions are satised (recall that V
e
1
is incurred before the signal is observed but that
V
e
2
is incurred only once the signal is observed and project 2 is pursued).
max
e2f`;hg
h
[(1  )(1  r
b
) + (1  r
g
)][p
e
1
(w
s
1
  w
f
1
) + w
f
1
]  V
e
1
i
+ (1  )r
b
max
e2f`;hg
[p
eb
2
(w
sb
2
  w
fb
2
) + w
fb
2
  V
e
2
]
+ r
g
max
e2f`;hg
[p
eg
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) + w
fg
2
  V
e
2
]
 max
e2f`;hg
h
[(1  r
g
)][p
e
1
(w
s
1
  w
f
1
) + w
f
1
]  V
e
1
i
+ (1  )r
g
max
e2f`;hg
[p
eb
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) + w
fg
2
  V
e
2
]
+ r
g
max
e2f`;hg
[p
eg
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) + w
fg
2
  V
e
2
]
9
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
;
(4.1)
max
e2f`;hg
h
[(1  )(1  r
b
) + (1  r
g
)][p
e
1
(w
s
1
  w
f
1
) + w
f
1
]  V
e
1
i
+ (1  )r
b
max
e2f`;hg
[p
eb
2
(w
sb
2
  w
fb
2
) + w
fb
2
  V
e
2
]
+ r
g
max
e2f`;hg
[p
eg
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) + w
fg
2
  V
e
2
]
 max
e2f`;hg
h
[(1  r
b
)][p
e
1
(w
s
1
  w
f
1
) + w
f
1
]  V
e
1
i
+ (1  )r
b
max
e2f`;hg
[p
eb
2
(w
sb
2
  w
fb
2
) + w
fb
2
  V
e
2
]
+ r
b
max
e2f`;hg
[p
eg
2
(w
sb
2
  w
fb
2
) + w
fb
2
  V
e
2
]
9
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
;
(4.2)
Condition (4:1) is necessary to guarantee that the agent will not always claim that  = g,
thereby generating too much exibility at the expense of too little eort invested in
project 1. Condition (4:2) is necessary to guarantee that the agent will not always claim
that  = b, thereby generating too much inertia.
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When the signal  is observable only by the agent, the principal's problem becomes:
max
r
b
;r
g
;w

[(1  )(1 r
b
) + (1  r
g
)][R
h
1
 

p
h
1
(w
s
1
  w
f
1
) + w
f
1

]
+ (1  )r
b
[R
hb
2
 

p
hb
2
(w
sb
2
  w
fb
2
) + w
fb
2

]
+ r
g
[R
hg
2
 

p
hg
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) + w
fg
2

]

subject to (2:1); (2:2); (2:3); (4:1); and (4:2)
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>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
=
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
;
(4.3)
Note that it is possible that constraints (4:1) and (4:2) be simultaneously binding: the
rents obtained from pursuing a good project 2 may not be high enough to induce the
agent to abandon project 1 when he has invested a high level of eort in it, while they
may still be high enough that the agent might simply prefer to invest no eort in project
1 and always recommend change. For reasons of tractability and simplicity, we shall rule
out this possibility. We assume
(A5):
p
hg
2
p
hb
2
>
p
h
1
p
`
1
We will show that A5 and A1 are sucient to guarantee that constraint (4:1) is never
binding.
Proposition 3: The solution to the principal's problem (4:3) entails: constraint (4:1) is
not binding, w
s
1
=  
1
=(1  r
g
), w
f
1
= 0, w
fg
2
= 0, p
hg
w
sg
2
= maxfp
hg
2
 
g
2
;
p
h
1
 
1
(1 r
g
)
+ V
h
2
],
r
b
= 0 while r
A
g
is given by:
r
A
g
=
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
1; if
p
h
1
 
1
1 
 max

p
hg
2
 
g
2
  V
h
2
; (1  )(R
hg
2
  V
h
2
 R
h
1
)
	
1

h
1 min
n

p
h
1
 
1
R
hg
2
 V
h
2
 R
h
1

1
2
;
p
h
1
 
1
(p
hg
2
 
g
2
 V
h
2
)
oi
; otherwise.
(4.4)
In this case, the organizational design must prevent the agent from always claiming
that the alternative project is bad. This is done by increasing the reward if project 2
is undertaken and successful. The extra rent necessary to elicit thruthful behavior from
17
the agent is given by
r
g
p
hg
2
(w
sg
2
   
g
2
) = r
g
max

0 ;
p
h
1
 
1
(1  r
g
)
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
+ V
h
2
	
(4.5)
and it is increasing and convex in r
g
; thus the bias towards the status quo. We can
therefore write the expected labor cost as a function of the exibility level as follows:
C
A
(r
g
) = p
h
1
 
1
+ r
g
p
hg
2
 
g
2
+ r
g
max

0 ;
p
h
1
 
1
(1  r
g
)
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
+ V
h
2
	
(4.6)
Let us dene ~r
A
g
as the value of r
g
for which
p
h
1
 
1
(1 r
g
)
= p
hg
2
 
g
2
  V
h
2
if a solution in [0; 1]
exists,
10
that is,
~r
A
g
=
1

"
1 
p
h
1
 
1
(p
hg
2
 
g
2
  V
h
2
)
#
:
The C
A
(r
g
) function is illustrated on Figure 2 together with the C
P
(r
g
) function (3:6)
and the isoprot curves of (r
g
; C).
10
As before, we set ~r
A
g
= 0 when p
h
1
 
1
< p
hg
2
 
g
2
  V
h
2
and ~r
A
g
= 1 when
p
h
1
 
1
(1 )
> p
hg
2
 
g
2
  V
h
2
.
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5. ASSIGNING AUTHORITY
In this section, we raise the following question. If either the agent or the principal,
but not both, can observe , to whom should be attributed the responsibility to observe 
and to decide accordingly whether to abandon or pursue project 1 ? Should the principal
(the residual claimant) be allowed to exercise her authority to decide on change or should
this authority be delegated to the agent ? Retention of the authority by the principal or
its delegation to the agent both present problems. The agent has vested interests in the
pursuit of project 1 and there is no reason to believe that his interests coincide with that
of the organization as a whole. On the other hand, the residual claimant may behave
opportunistically in order not to pay the rent promised to the agent if project 1 were
pursued and succeeded or in order to fool the agent in putting high eort in an alternative
bad project. In both cases, agency costs may be required to limit opportunistic behavior.
When  is observed only by the principal, these extra rents are given by (3:5). When  is
observed only by the agent, these extra rents are given by (4:5). They are both increasing
and convex in r
g
. Hence it may be advantageous to create a bias towards the status quo.
Furthermore:
Proposition 4: Under A1 to A5, we obtain ~r
P
g
 ~r
A
g
and r
P
g
 r
A
g
and it is preferable
(not necessarily strictly) to give the authority to the agent if only if:
p
hg
2
 
g
2
  V
h
2
 R
h
1
  (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
): (5.1)
The result of Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 2 for which we let p
h
1
 
1
1 
>
p
hg
2
 
g
2
  V
h
2
> R
h
1
  (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
) which implies that 0 < ~r
P
g
< ~r
A
g
< 1 and thus
that it is strictly preferable to assign the authority to the agent.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
The minimal labor cost associated with a degree of exibility r
g
when the authority is
assigned to the rm exceeds the labor costs when it is assigned to the agent if and only if
(5:1) holds. Furthermore, since the optimal level of r
g
when the authority is assigned to
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the agent is not smaller than ~r
P
g
, the principal does strictly better by giving the authority
to the agent.
The optimal incentive system when the agent has the authority to recommend change
diers from the optimal incentive system when the principal is the one observing the
signal . In the former case, the incentive system must induce the agent to accept to
abandon the initial project and switch to the alternative one when the latter appears to
be good, that is, when  = g. In order to provide the necessary incentive to the agent,
w
sg
2
is increased: the agent gets a better deal when the alternative project is a success and
since w
sg
2
 w
fg
2
is also increased, the agent is overinduced to provide a high level of eort.
When the principal is the only one observing the signal on the quality of the alternative
project, the incentive problem is to insure that the rm does not always recommend
change. In order to provide the necessary credible incentive to the principal, w
fg
2
is
increased: the principal must commit to pay a rent to the agent when the alternative
project is a failure. Since the wedge w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
is kept constant (equal to  
g
2
) to induce
the agent to provide a high level of eort, the payment w
fg
2
> 0 is similar to a upfront
payment in case of a switch. This is meant to signal to the agent that the project is
indeed good and that a high level of eort is protable. Hence, the optimal incentive
intensity is stronger when the agent is responsible for observing the signal , that is, has
the authority to recommend change.
11
11
This is reminiscent of Milgrom and Roberts' (1992, chap. 12) discussion of the complementarities between
discretion and incentives.
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6. CONCLUSION
Using a simple model, we have shown that it is possible to generate an environment
where agents are endogenously given the authority to decide on change, in particular to
block change that the principal would have undertaken had they allowed themselves to be
better informed. We show that inertia (bias towards the status quo) can be optimal from
an ex ante point of view in the presence of (informational) rents and private information.
Inertia in organization may take many forms or come from many sources. Although
we abstracted from those specic forms to concentrate on the fundamental trade-o
between ex ante incentives and ex post exibility, it is informative to consider those
forms and sources. Let us briey consider three settings, typical we think of more
general situations. The three settings are examples of situations where only the agent
observes the signal on the probability of success of the alternative project. A rst setting
relates to the fact, quite common in organizations, that career possibilities, bonuses
and promotions, are linked to the successful completion of projects, or at least of some
signicant portion of a project. If that is so, one may expect that better informed agents
will tend to pursue a project even if they know that an alternative project now represents
a more protable opportunity for the rm. Abandoning the initial project in favor of the
alternative project will be detrimental to the agent's career. Hence, the rm's exibility
level will be suboptimal, even more so if those incentives for inexibility are not properly
taken into account in the rm's career evaluation process. It will in general be necessary
to jointly determine the rewards accruing to the agent in the two mutually exclusive
projects.
12
It may even be necessary to value and reward a recommendation to abandon
a project coming from those who were responsible to make it a success by providing
the necessary eorts to achieve its successful completion ! A second setting pertains
12
In an interview with The Economist (1995.03.18), Livio DeSimone, Chairman and CEO of 3M, stressed
that employees become less innovative if their job security is threatened and therefore, it is a policy of
3M to give such job security to its labor force. In order to avoid too much inertia, he has imposed tough
innovation goals (30% of annual sales must come from products less than four years old; 10% from products
introduced during the year) and very demanding organizational goals (marketing folks have direct contacts
with scientists; R&D sta are directly involved in product strategy; cross-functional teams abound).
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to the \political" cover-up of unfavorable information by agents. Such situations can
occur because the eorts sunk by the agent in an initial position or project cannot be
transferred to the alternative position or project. The new information, on the increased
benets associated with the alternative position or on the reduced benets associated
with the initial position, may be hidden or manipulated by the agent to make it appear
less favorable to the alternative than it really is. It may again be necessary, from an
organizational performance viewpoint, to value and reward the failure in making the
initial position a success. Finally, a third general context refers to the situations in
which an independent appraisal concludes that a partially completed project should
be abandoned because its completion will involve additional costs which cannot be
recuperated from the total future benets to be generated by the project. Systematically
applying the textbook principle \bygones are bygones" may lead to reduced ex ante eorts
to make the initial project protable. The principal may nd necessary, and protable,
to commit ex ante to pursue such projects even if information, unfavorable to pursuing
the project, is revealed to her.
In a recent paper, Aghion and Tirole (1994) show that the allocation of formal author-
ity in organizations, that is the allocation of \rights" to decide, may dier signicantly
from the allocation of real authority, that is the allocation of \eective control" on de-
cisions. The real authority is determined by the relevant information structure in the
organization. In the principal-agent context, with the agent typically more informed
than the principal (our second context above), an increase in the agent's real author-
ity will produce initiative and eort but at the expense of less control and integration
in the organization. Aghion and Tirole consider dierent ways to credibly increase the
subordinate's or agent's real authority in a formally integrated structure with the super-
visor or principal keeping the \legal" rights to decide: the work overload of supervisors,
the design of lenient discipline rules for deviant behavior by the agent, the timing of
background studies leading to an urgency of decision, the repeated interactions leading
22
to the principal's reputation for non-intervention, improved performance measurement
and nally the splitting of decision rights between multiple superiors through a matricial
organizational form.
We have shown in this paper that exibility in an organization is a somewhat more
subtle and more elusive concept than what one may infer from the existing economic and
management literature on the subject. More generally, there are procedures and institu-
tions in organizations and rms which restrict and reduce the capacity or willingness to
introduce and implement change. These procedures and institutions may be necessary
to generate the optimal level of inertia. We showed that more exibility in adapting to
changing conditions or new information, typically known or observed by either the agent
or the principal but not both, may come at the expense of eorts exerted up front by the
agent to make the organization more successful. There is a trade-o in this context be-
tween ex ante eorts and ex post exibility of adaptation. The principal may sometimes
be better o to be the informed party and to keep herself the authority to recommend
change and sometimes be better o to let the agent be the informed party and be the
initiator of change. The current popular arguments for exibility in production, human
capital, nancial structure and contracts, and more generally in organizations seem to
have neglected the fundamental trade-o which we characterized here and which is likely
to be present in many situations. Although we still have a long way to go to propose a
general framework to study the factors behind the value of exibility in organizations,
we like to think that the current paper is a modest but positive step in that direction.
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7. APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Clearly, when the signal  is common knowledge and contractible,
we have w
f
1
= w
fg
2
= w
fb
2
= 0. The principal has no reason to make positive any of those
payments in case of project failure. Moreover, if the principal wishes to elicit a high level
of eort from the agent, conditions (2:1), (2:2) and (2:3) will be binding for the payment
prole announced by the principal. Also, from the latter part of A2, the principal always
prefers to elicit high eort in project 2. Hence, given some arbitrary switching rule
(r
g
; r
b
), the best the principal can do is given by the expected prots:
[(1  r
g
)+(1  )(1  r
b
)]maxfR
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
(1  r
g
) + (1  )(1  r
b
)
; R
`
1
g
+ r
g
[R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
] + (1  )r
b
[R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
b
2
]:
< [(1  r
g
) + (1  )(1  r
b
)][R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
(1  r
g
)
]
+ r
g
[R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
] + (1  )r
b
[R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
b
2
]
 [(1  r
g
)][R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
(1  r
g
)
] + r
g
[R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
]
 [(1  )][R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
(1  )
] + [R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
]:
The rst (strict) inequality follows from A2; the second inequality follows from A4 while
the third follows from A3. The expected prots obtained from any switching rule (r
g
; r
b
)
and eort levels e
1
and e
2
are therefore no greater than the prots obtained when r
g
= 1,
r
b
= 0 and high eort is always elicited. QED
Proof of Proposition 2: Let us assume that constraint (3:1) is not binding (we will show
that the solution to (3:3) without imposing (3:1) satises (3:1)). Since increasing w
f
1
reduces the objective function and tightens the constraints, it is optimal to let w
f
1
= 0.
Since R
h
1
 p
h
1
 
1
1 
 R
hb
2
 p
hb
2
(w
sb
2
 w
fb
2
) w
fb
2
by A4, the objective function is decreasing
with r
b
and reducing r
b
weakens the constraints. It is therefore optimal to set r
b
= 0. It
is clearly optimal to set the wages such that constraints (2:1), (2:2) and (2:3) are binding.
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It follows that w
s
1
=
 
1
(1 r
g
)
and (w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) =  
g
2
. Given this, (3:2) becomes
R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
  w
fg
2
 R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
1  r
g
(3:2
0
)
and thus
w
fg
2
= max

0 ; (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
)  (R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
(1  r
g
)
)
	
: (7.1)
Using (7:1) together with the values or expressions derived above for r
b
, w
f
1
, w
s
1
, w
fg
2
and
w
sg
2
, the principal's problem (3:3) can be written as (3:4). In order to complete the proof,
we need to show that constraint (3:1) is then always satised. This constraint (3:1) can
then be rewritten as:
r
g
[R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
1  r
g
]  r
g
[R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
  w
fg
2
]: (3:1
0
)
If w
fg
2
= 0, then (3:1
0
) is satised from A3. If w
fg
2
> 0, then (3:2
0
) must be binding and
therefore (3:1
0
) becomes
r
g
[R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
]  r
g
[R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
]: (3:1
00
)
If (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
)  (R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
), condition (3:1
00
) is satised for all r
g
2 [0; 1]; If
(R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
) > (R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
), then (3:4) is maximized for r
g
= 0 and therefore (3:1
00
)
is satised. Thus, (3:1) is always satised. QED
Proof of Corollary 1: When p
h
1
 
1
< (1  )[R
h
1
  (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
)], (3:2
0
) is never binding
and therefore, the principal always reveal truthfully the value of the signal  and no
distortion from the common knowledge exibility level is necessary. When (1  )[R
h
1
 
(R
hb
2
 p
hb
2
 
g
2
)] < p
h
1
 
1
< (1 )
2
[(R
hg
2
 p
hg
2
 
g
2
)  (R
hb
2
 p
hb
2
 
g
2
)], the principal must bear
extra agency costs (w
fg
2
> 0) to make her announcement of  credible, but nevertheless
the maximum of (3:4) is still obtained when r
g
= 1. QED
Proof of Corollary 2: When (3:9) holds, the principal's prot (3:4) is a decreasing func-
tion of r
g
. QED
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Proof of Corollary 3: When p
h
1
 
1
lies between the extreme values dened by (3:8) and
(3:9), the optimum is either at
1

"
1 
 
p
h
1
 
1
(R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
 
g
2
)  (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
)

1
2
#
; the tangency
point between the convex portion of the labor cost curve and an isoprot curve, or at
the kink
1


1 maxf0;
p
h
1
 
1
R
h
1
  (R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
 
g
2
)
g

which is strictly between 0 and 1. QED
Proof of Corollary 4: Clear from the text.
Proof of Proposition 3: Let us assume away constraint (4:1); we will show that the
solution without constraint (4:1) corresponds to the mechanism stated in the above
proposition and the solution always satises constraint (4:1).
If p
h
1
 
1
1 
 p
hg
2
 
g
2
  V
h
2
, that is, if the expected rent associated with switching to the
good project 2 is at least as large as the expected payment
13
from project 1 under the
common knowledge switching rule (r
g
; r
b
) = (1; 0), then it is possible to implement the
allocation as if  were contractible: we can set r
b
= 0, r
g
= 1, w
sg
2
=  
g
2
and w
s
1
=
 
1
1 
and w
fg
2
= w
f
1
= 0. Condition (4:2) is then satised and the agent has no incentive to
misreport .
If p
hg
2
 
g
2
  V
h
2
< p
h
1
 
1
(1 )
, the agent will have an incentive to pretend that project 2 is
bad even when  = g in order to protect his rent which is larger when pursuing project 1.
To induce the agent to truthfully reveal , he must be subject to a positive probability
of switching if he announces that  = b and/or receive a larger payment if project 2 is
pursued and successful: we must have r
b
> 0 or w
sg
2
>  
g
2
, or both.
We now show that r
b
= 0. Given some arbitrary switching rule (r
b
; r
g
), the level of
expected prot when w
s
1
= p
h
1
 
1
1 r
g
 (1 )r
b
, is given by:
(1  r
g
  (1  )r
b
)[R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
1  r
g
  (1  )r
b
]
+ r
g
[R
hg
2
  p
hg
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
)  w
fg
2
]
+ (1  )r
b
[R
hb
2
  p
hb
2
(w
sb
2
  w
fb
2
)  w
fb
2
]
(7.2)
13
The cost of eort V
h
1
has been sunk by the time the switch is considered.
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and constraint (4:2) can be rewritten as
r
g
(p
hg
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) + w
fg
2
  V
h
2
) (r
g
  r
b
)
p
h
1
 
1
1  r
g
  (1  )r
b
+ r
b
max
e2f`;hg
[p
eg
2
(w
sb
2
  w
fb
2
) + w
fb
2
  V
e
2
];
which implies that
r
g
(p
hg
2
(w
sg
2
  w
fg
2
) + w
fg
2
  V
h
2
)  (r
g
 
1  

r
b
)
p
h
1
 
1
1  r
g
: (7.3)
Substituting (7:3) into (7:2), we obtain that for every switching rule (r
b
; r
g
) the principal's
prots are no greater than:
(1  r
g
)R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
+ r
g

R
hg
2
 
p
h
1
 
1
(1  r
g
)
  V
h
2

  (1  )r
b

(R
h
1
 
p
h
1
 
1
(1  r
g
)
)  (R
hb
2
 

p
hb
2
(w
sb
2
  w
fb
2
) + w
fb
2

)

:
(7.4)
When r
b
= 0, the principal's prot (7:2) reaches this upper bound (7:4) which by A4
is a decreasing function of r
b
. Hence the principal does better by setting r
b
= 0 and
w
s
1
= p
h
1
 
1
(1 r
g
)
.
With r
b
= 0, (4:2) can be written as
p
hg
2
w
sg
2
 p
h
1
 
1
(1  r
g
)
+ V
h
2
(7.5)
If (7:5) is binding, giving w
sg
2
as an increasing function of r
g
, the principal's problem
becomes:
max
r
g
(1  r
g
)R
h
1
  p
h
1
 
1
+ r
g

R
hg
2
 
p
h
1
 
1
(1  r
g
)
  V
h
2

: (7.6)
The rst order condition for r
g
(for an interior solution) leads to
(1  r
g
) =
 
p
h
1
 
1
R
hg
2
  V
h
2
 R
h
1
!
1
2
:
However, this value of r
g
may fail to induce a high level of eort if p
hg
2
w
sg
2
obtained from
(7:5) is smaller than p
hg
2
 
g
2
. In that case, we must replace p
hg
2
w
sg
2
with p
hg
2
 
g
2
in (7:5)
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now binding and solve for r
g
. Note that if p
h
1
 
1
 (1   )
2
(R
hg
2
  V
h
2
  R
h
1
), we have
the corner solution r
g
= 1; however r
g
= 0 is impossible since p
h
1
 
1
< (R
hg
2
  V
h
2
  R
h
1
)
because of A3 and the existence of informational rents. Hence we have (4:4).
We must complete the proof by showing that (4:1) is satised. If p
h
1
 
1
1 
 p
hg
2
 
g
2
  V
h
2
,
we can verify that (4:1) is satised as follows. We have p
h
1
 
1
  V
h
1
=
p
`
1
V
h
1
(p
h
1
 p
`
1
)
> 0;
by assumption, we have p
`b
2
= 0 and V
`
2
= 0 and therefore, [p
`b
2
 
g
2
  V
`
2
] = 0; we
also have p
hb
2
 
g
2
  V
h
2
= p
hb
2
V
h
2
p
hg
2
  p
`g
2
  V
h
2
=
p
hb
2
V
h
2
 (p
hg
2
 p
`g
2
)V
h
2
p
hg
2
 p
`g
2
< 0 by A1; thus
p
h
1
 
1
  V
h
1
 (1  )max
e
[p
eb
2
 
g
2
  V
e
2
] = 0 and constraint (4:1) is satised.
If p
h
1
 
1
1 
> p
hg
2
 
g
2
  V
h
2
, then w
s
1
=  
1
=(1   r
g
) and r
b
= 0; the left hand side of (4:1)
is then equal to (1   r
g
)p
h
1
w
s
1
  V
h
1
+ (1   r
g
)p
`
1
w
s
1
= (1   )r
g
p
`
1
w
s
1
since e = h is
optimal for w
s
1
=  
1
=(1   r
g
) i the probability of pursuing project 1 is no less than
1   r
g
and since V
`
1
= 0 by assumption. Since (7:5), or (4:2), is binding, we have
p
h
1
w
s
1
= p
hg
2
w
sg
2
  V
h
2
, that is, w
sg
2
=
p
h
1
w
s
1
+V
h
2
p
hg
2
and therefore, the right hand side of (4:1)
is equal to (1  )r
g
p
hb
2
p
hg
2
(p
h
1
w
s
1
+ V
h
2
)  V
h
2
. Conditions (4:1) can then be written as
(1  r
g
)(p
`
1
p
hg
2
  p
h
1
p
hb
2
)w
s
1
> ((1  r
g
)p
hb
2
  p
hg
2
)V
h
2
which is satised since the right hand side is negative from A1 and the left hand side is
positive from A5. Hence, (4:1) is satised. QED
Proof of Proposition 4: The rst inequality follows from the denitions of ~r
P
g
and ~r
A
g
.
We have a strict inequality if (5:1) holds with a strict inequality. The result r
P
g
 r
A
g
is
obtained from
@C
P
(r
g
)
@r
g

@C
A
(r
g
)
@r
g
i (5:1) holds.
Finally, it is (strictly) preferable to give the authority to the agent if only if the principal
attains in so doing a higher isoprot curve. She does if and only if (5:1) holds (with a
strict inequality). QED
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